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Abstract
We investigate the dierences and connections between discrete-space and
continuous-space social interactionmodels. Although our class of continuous-
space model has a unique equilibrium, we find that discretized models can
have multiple equilibria for any degree of discretization, which necessitates
a stability analysis of equilibria. We present a general framework for charac-
terizations of equilibria and their stability under a broad class of evolutionary
dynamics by using the properties of a potential game. Although the equilib-
rium population distribution in the continuous space is uniquely given by a
symmetric unimodal distribution, wefind that such adistribution is not always
stable in a discrete space. On the other hand, we also show that any sequence
of a discrete-space model’s equilibria converges with the continuous-space
model’s unique equilibrium as the discretization is refined.
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1 Introduction
Beckmann’s (1976) social interaction model has been an important benchmark
for the study of spatial agglomeration. Considering the fact that face-to-face com-
munications are important to understand the mechanisms behind spatial distribu-
tions of economic activities, Beckmann presents a model in which people aiming
to interact with others choose their locations. People can save the costs of inter-
actions by locating close to one other, but agglomeration causes congestion such
as increases in housing prices. Equilibrium population distributions, which are of
interest to this paper, emerge as a result of the trade-o between the positive and
negative eects of agglomeration. This type of model has been of particular inter-
est for urban economists because the location of an urban center is not specified a
priori unlike classical urban models such as the monocentric city model.1
Beckmann (1976) considers social interactions among households for a linear
city that is represented by a real line, and Tabuchi (1986) and Mossay and Picard
(2011) also consider social interactions among a single type of agents on the real
line.2 All of these studies attain symmetric unimodal population distributions
as unique equilibria. The uniqueness result is compelling, and the equilibrium
distribution is intuitively reasonable. Moreover, if theplannerwould like to address
any ineciencies due to externalities, he could support the optimum as the unique
equilibrium by internalizing externalities because the equilibrium under such an
intervention is also unique. Their analysis is theoretically concise and insightful,
1See, for example, Section 3.3 of Fujita and Thisse (2013).
2Mossay and Picard (2011) consider consumers, whereas Tabuchi (1986) considers firms. Besides
models on the real line, O’Hara (1976) considers the social interactions of firms in a square city, and
Borukhov andHochman (1977) consider the social interactions of consumers in a circular city. They
also obtain a symmetric unimodal distribution as a unique equilibrium. However, in Borukhov
and Hochman (1977), the cost of social interaction is not weighted by population density, so social
interactions do not cause any externality.
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but it is also important to study whether the results attained in continuous-space
models are robust in terms of the discretization of space, because they might
represent idealization in the smooth continuous world. In particular, if we would
like to empirically test the model, we would have to discretize it. In a discrete
world, we expect that the equilibrium is generally not unique. In such a case,
we have to address the stability of equilibria, and there is no guarantee that the
symmetric unimodal distribution always represents a stable equilibrium.
There are few papers on spatial social interactions using a discrete-spacemodel.
Anas and Xu (1999) present a multi-regional general equilibrium model in which
every region employs labor and produces goods. Although the technology exhibits
a constant return to scale, the goods are dierentiated over regions and consumers
travel to each region to purchase them, which yields an agglomeration force in
the central region.3 Although their model is useful for the evaluation of urban
policies, they rely entirely on numerical simulations, forcing us to consider par-
ticular equilibrium that might be unstable in case of multiple equilibria. Turner
(2005) and Caruso et al. (2009) consider one-dimensional discrete-space location
models with neighborhood externalities in the sense that utility, at a particular
location, depends on the population distribution of that neighborhood.4 Caruso et
al. (2009) rely on numerical simulations, while Turner (2005) generically attains a
unique equilibrium outcome by considering an extreme type of neighborhood ex-
ternalities wherein an individual located between vacant neighborhoods receives
a bonus. However, because they focus on the eects of residential locations on
open spaces, they abstract away from the endogenous determination of an urban
3Braid (1988) considers a five-townmodel having a similar structure, although he abstracts away
fromgeneral equilibriumeects. He shows that, depending on the degree of product dierentiation,
the equilibrium firm distribution can be bimodal.
4Caruso et al. (2007) considers a two-dimensional discrete space.
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center, although this remains an important feature of the model in which we are
interested.5
In this paper, we consider social interactions among consumers in the discrete
space in which a finite number of cities are evenly distributed on a line segment,
and we study the properties of equilibria accordingly. To this end, we begin with
writing the model for a general quasi-linear utility function, invoking the fact
that our model of location choice can be described as a potential game (Moderer
and Shapley, 1996).6 One important consequence of being a potential game is
that the equilibrium can be characterized with a finite-dimensional optimization
problem. Indeed, by assuming that the pair-wise interaction cost between cities is
symmetric, we can identify a function, which is called a potential function, so that
the set of equilibria coincides exactly with the set of Kurash-Kuhn-Tucker points
for the maximization problem of the function. Moreover, for our stability analysis,
we recognize the fact that every local maximizer of the potential function is a stable
equilibrium under a broad class of myopic evolutionary dynamics. Note that the
stability of equilibria has not been addressed in continuous-space models.7 The
discretization of space reduces the dimension of stability analysis and enables us
to scrutinize the properties of equilibria more closely.
After the general characterization of equilibria and their stability mentioned
above, we focus on a discrete version of Mossay and Picard’s (2011) model to have
a closer look at equilibrium properties. Because the utility function is linear in city
populations under their model, it is possible to obtain analytical results regarding
5Moreover, they make the so-called open-city assumption in which the equilibrium utility level
is exogenous, whereas the total city population is endogenous.
6See Oyama (2009a, b) and Fujishima (2013) for applications of the potential game approach to
geography models.
7Naturally, continuous-spacemodels are not always free from the problemofmultiple equilibria,
as we will discuss in the concluding remarks.
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equilibrium properties for an arbitrary number of cities.8 We show that, as long
as the interaction cost is not too small, the equilibrium is essentially non-unique
in the sense that equilibria having dierent numbers of populated cities coexist.
In particular, we can pin down a range of the interaction costs where multiple
equilibria arise for any finite number of cities. Thus, the uniqueness is not robust in
termsof thediscretization of space. Moreover, although the equilibriumpopulation
reaches its peak at the central city in the continuous-space model, we find a case in
which the single largest city does not emerge at any stable equilibria. Therefore, the
type of population distribution that is uniquely attained in the continuous-space
model is not always stable in the discrete world.
Although the results above address the dierence of equilibrium properties be-
tween discrete and continuous spaces, we also investigate the connections among
them. In particular, we increase the number of cities while the total size of location
space remains fixed, and we study the limiting properties of equilibria. We show
that any sequence of the discrete-space model’s equilibria converges to the equilib-
rium of the continuous-space model as the number of cities goes to infinity, or the
distance between adjacent cities vanishes. This means that the set of equilibria is
continuous in the number of cities at their limit because equilibrium in a continu-
ous space is unique. This result merits attention because the non-uniqueness result
mentioned above can be true for any finite number of cities if the interaction cost
is suciently large. Our result implies that, even if there were multiple equilibria,
all of them would converge to a single equilibrium as discretization is refined.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a general class of social
interactionmodels, characterizing this class as a potential game. Section 3 examines
8Tabuchi (1982) considers the same class of discrete-space social interaction model, though he
studies only the social planner’s problem.
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the uniqueness and stability of equilibria. Section 4 investigates the connections
between discrete-space and continuous-space models by increasing the number of
cities. Section 5 concludes the paper. Proofs omitted in the main text are provided
in Appendix.
2 The Model
We start with a general class of discrete-space social interaction models that
includes thediscrete-space analogueofBeckmann’s (1976) andMossay andPicard’s
(2011) models as special cases. This description allows us to illustrate how the
potential function approach generally works for the equilibrium characterization
and stability analysis of discrete-space social interaction models.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We consider a region in which K cities are evenly distributed on a line segment
normalized as the unit interval [0; 1]. Cities are labeled by i 2 S  f1; 2;    ;Kg in
order of distance from location 0, and city i’s location is xi  1K

i   12

2 [0; 1]. Each
city has the same amount of land A=K so that the total amount of land in the region
is fixed at A regardless of the number of cities. See Figure 1 for the structure of this
region. As is common in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords.
The opportunity cost of land is normalized to zero.
Figure 1: The regional structure
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There are a unit mass of identical consumers in this region. Let ni 2 [0; 1] be
the mass of consumers in city i and let  
n
n = (n1;    ;nK) 2 RK+ :
PK
i=1 ni = 1
o
denote the set of consumers’ spatial distributions. Each consumer travels to every
other consumer for social interaction. In each city, they have the same preference
ui(zi; yi) for residential land yi and for the composite good zi which is chosen as
the nume´raire. Given land rent ri and population distribution n 2 , the utility
maximization problem of consumers in city i is expressed as
max
zi;yi
n
ui(zi; yi) j zi + riyi + Ti(n)  Y; i 2 S
o
; (1)
where ri denotes the land rent in city i and Y is the fixed income. Ti(n) is the total
cost of traveling to other consumers from city i, which is defined as
Ti(n)  
KX
j=1
di jn j; (2)
where di j denotes the travel cost from city i to j. We assume that D = (di j) fulfills
the following four conditions: (i) dii = 0 for all i 2 S; (ii) di j = d ji for any i; j 2 S;
(iii) D is conditionally negative definite; and (iv) di j + d jk  dik for any i < j < k.9
In the terminology of spatial statistics, the first three conditions imply that di j is
an isotropic variogram. This class of travel costs includes the exponential cost
(di j = ejxi x jj   1) and the linear cost (di j = jxi   x jj), both of which are commonly
assumed in the literature of spatial interaction.
The utility function ui(zi; yi) is assumed to be quasi-linear:
ui(zi; yi) = zi + fi(yi); (3)
9An n nmatrixM is conditionally negative definite if x0Mx < 0 for all x 2 Rn such thatPni=1 xi = 0.
See, e.g., Bapat and Raghavan (1997) for properties of conditionally negative definite matrices.
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where fi(x) is a strictly increasing, concave, and twice dierentiable function for
x > 0. We also assume that limx!0 f 0i (x) = 1. Note that fi can be city-specific. If
fi(x) =  ln x [resp. fi(x) =   2x ] where  > 0 is a constant, we obtain the discrete-
space analogue of Beckmann’s (1976) [resp. Mossay and Picard’s (2011)] model.
2.2 Spatial Equilibrium and Potential Games
Having elaborated the structure of the model, we will now define the equilib-
rium. Becauseourmodel includes the location choice of consumers, the equilibrium
conditions require that a consumer chooses a city that gives him the highest utility,
in addition to choosing an optimal allocation in his city.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of allocations (zi ; y

i )
K
i=1, land rents (r

i )
K
i=1,
and a population distribution n 2  such that
1. Given ri and n
 2 , (zi ; yi ) solves problem (1) for all i 2 S;
2. For all i 2 S, the land market clears whenever ni > 0;
3. Given (ri )
K
i=1 and n
 2 , no one has incentive to change his location. That is, there
exists u 2 R such that8>>>>><>>>>>:
u = ui(zi ; y

i ) if n

i > 0;
u  ui(zi ; yi ) if ni = 0;
8i 2 S: (4)
In particular, we call an equilibrium population distribution n 2  a spatial equi-
librium. Under the quasi-linear utility function specified in (3), the first-order
condition for the utility maximization problem (1) is
f 0i (yi)  ri 8i 2 S; (5)
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where the equality holdswhenever yi > 0. However, because themarginal utility of
residential land is infinity at yi = 0 by assumption, we must have yi > 0. Therefore,
f 0i (yi) = ri for all i 2 S. For yi > 0, let gi( f 0i (yi)) be the inverse function of f 0i (yi) (i.e.,
gi( f 0i (yi)) = yi).
10 Then, gi(ri) is the per-capita demand for the residential land in
city i, and the indirect utility of consumers in city i is
vi(ri;Y   Ti(n))  max
zi;yi
n
ui(zi; yi) j zi + riyi + Ti(n)  Y; i 2 S
o
= Y   Ti(n)   rigi(ri) + fi(gi(ri)):
(6)
The equilibrium land rent is determined so that the land market clears, as long
as consumers are willing to pay more than the opportunity cost of land that is
assumed to be zero. Let r¯i be the land rent at which the total demand nigi(ri) of the
residential land in city i is equal to the total land supply A=K. Then,
ri = maxfr¯i; 0g 8i 2 S: (7)
If r¯i < 0, land is used for non-residential purpose, and we necessarily have yi = 0.
However, it follows from ri = f 0i (yi) > 0 that this does not occur. Therefore, the
equilibrium condition (7) reduces to
gi(ri ) =
A
niK
8i 2 S: (8)
Let
hi(ni) = fi
 A
niK

  A
niK
f 0i
 A
niK

: (9)
Because ri = f 0i (
A
niK
), this is the net utility from land consumption. Then, the
10From the assumption that f (x) is a strictly increasing function, the inverse function exists for
x > 0.
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argument above leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. n 2  is a spatial equilibrium if and only if there exists v 2 R such that
8>>>>><>>>>>:
v = vi(n) if ni > 0;
v  vi(n) if ni = 0;
8i 2 S; (10)
where vi(n) is the indirect utility function in city i defined by
vi(n)  vi

f 0i
 A
niK

;Y   Ti(n)

= Y   Ti(n) + hi(ni): (11)
Writing the indirect utilities in a vector form, we have
v(n)  (vi(n))Ki=1 = Y1   T(n) + h(n) (12)
where T(n) = (Ti(n))Ki=1(= Dn), h(n) = (hi(ni))
K
i=1, and 1 is a vector of ones with an
appropriate dimension. Note that T(n) summarizes the social interaction costs,
and people prefer to agglomerate to reduce these costs. On the other hand, h(n)
summarizes the net utilities from land, and land consumption causes congestion
because h0i (ni) =
A2
n3i K
2 f 00i (
A
niK
) < 0. Therefore, people prefer to disperse and escape
from the congestion. As we will see, a spatial equilibrium is attained as a result of
tradeos between the agglomeration force represented by T(n) and the dispersion
force represented by h(n).
In what follows, to characterize spatial equilibria and their stability, we invoke
the properties of a potential game that is introduced byMonderer and Shapley (1996).
Note that, because we are interested in the spatial equilibrium, our model may be
viewed as a game in which the set of players is [0; 1], the (common) action set is
10
S, and the payo vector is (vi)Ki=1 by Lemma 1.
11 Moreover, as is evident from the
definition, a spatial equilibrium is actually a Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus,
let us denote our game by G = (vi)Ki=1. Then, we define that G is a potential game if
(vi)Ki=1 allows for a continuously dierentiable functionW such that
@W(n)
@ni
  @W(n)
@n j
= vi(n)   v j(n) 8n 2 ;8i; j 2 S (13)
where W is defined on an open set containing  so that its partial derivative is
well-defined on . If the condition above holds,W is called a potential function.
Suppose, for the moment, that G is a potential game with the potential function
W. As mentioned in the introduction, the equilibria of a potential game are charac-
terized with the optimization problem of an associated potential function. Indeed,
let us consider the following problem:
max
n2
W(n): (14)
Let  be a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
PK
i=1 ni = 1. Then, the first-order
condition is @W(n)@ni   where the equality holds whenever ni > 0. Then, by (13), we
have vi(n) = v j(n) for any populated cities i and j, and vk(n)  vi(n) if nk = 0 and
ni > 0. Therefore, n is a spatial equilibrium. By similar reasoning, it follows that the
converse is also true.12 That is, if n is a spatial equilibrium, it satisfies the necessary
condition for problem (14). Therefore, the equilibrium set of G exactly coincides with
the set of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points of problem (14).
The necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a potential function
11A game with a continuum of anonymous players is called a population game (Sandholm, 2001).
In our game, players are anonymous in that the payo depends on only strategy distributions.
12See Proposition 3.1 of Sandholm (2001).
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is the triangular integrability (see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988), which, in our
model, is stated as
di j + d jk + dki = dik + dkj + d ji for any i; j; k 2 S: (15)
Recall that our travel costs are pair-wise symmetric (i.e., di j = d ji for any i; j 2 S).
Hence, the condition above necessarily holds, and our game is a potential game.
Indeed, the following lemma explicitly constructs a potential function for (vi)Ki=1.
Lemma 2. G is a potential game with the potential function
W(n)  W1(n) +W2(n) (16)
where
W1(n) =  
I
T(n0)dn0 =  1
2
KX
i=1
KX
j=1
di jnin j; (17)
W2(n) =
I
h(n0)dn0 =
KX
i=1
ni fi
 A
niK

: (18)
H
denotes the line integral over a path in  connecting 0 to n. Because di j = d ji for
any i; j 2 S, it is guaranteed that the line integrals are path-independent.
Observe that, in our potential game, we can recognize the tradeo between
centrifugal and centripedal forces as the tradeo between the concavity and con-
vexity of the potential function. Indeed, W2 is strictly concave because fi’s are
strictly concave, whereas W1 is quasiconvex because D is nonnegative and condi-
tionally negative definite.13 If the concavity of W2 dominates so that W is strictly
concave, a dispersed population distribution (i.e., an interior point in ) is attained
13See, for example, Theorem 4.4.6 of Bapat and Raghavan (1997).
12
as a unique equilibrium. On the other hand, if the convexity of W1 dominates,
equilibrium population distributions would be more agglomerated. Therefore,W1
represents the centripedal force whereasW2 represents the centrifugal force.
It is also worth pointing out that, by using the potential function, the discrete-
space social interaction model might be viewed as a deterministic representation
of the random utility discrete choice model. To illustrate this point, let us consider
the following choice probability function:
	() = argmax
n2
  n +W2(n) (19)
wherewe interpret 2 RK as the original payo vector andW2(n) as a deterministic
perturbation to the payos.14 Then, it can easily be verified that n 2  is a spatial
equilibrium if and only if n = 	(Dn).15
2.3 Stability
2.3.1 Adjustment Dynamics
We are interested in the stability of equilibria particularly because our model
generally includes multiple equilibria, as shown in the next section. Specifically,
14See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) for more details.
15If W2(n) =  PKi=1 ni lnni + const, which corresponds to Beckmann’s (1976) model, it is well
known that the resulting choice probability is induced by the logit model:
	i() =
exp( 1i)PK
j=1 exp( 1 j)
: (20)
Then, because the spatial equilibrium is a fixed point of	(Dn), it solves
ni =
exp( 1Ti(n))PK
j=1 exp( 1T j(n))
8i 2 S; (21)
and thus it is the quantal response equilibrium due to McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). See also earlier
contributions in transportation science such as Daganzo and She (1977).
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we are interested in whether we can justify an equilibrium through the existence of
a learning process that makes players settle down in their equilibrium strategies. It
would be unlikely to attain equilibria that cannot be justified in the above sense, so
wewould like to restrict our attention to stable equilibria. In this paper, we describe
players’ learning process with an evolutionary dynamic, or a (set-valued) dynamical
system V that maps population distribution n0 2  to a set of Lipschitz paths
in  that starts from n0.16 Although we usually consider a specific evolutionary
dynamic for stability analysis, we will see that a more general analysis is possible
due to the existence of a potential function. That is, the stability of equilbria can be
characterized under a broad class of dynamics. In particular, we consider the class
of admissible dynamics defined below:
Definition 2. An evolutionary dynamic V is admissible for G = (vi)Ki=1 if for almost all
t  0 and for all n0 2 , it satisfies the following conditions:
(PC) n˙(t) , 0) n˙(t)  v(n(t)) > 0 for all n(  ) 2 V(n0),
(NS) n˙(t) = 0) n(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G for all n(  ) 2 V(n0).
To interpret condition (PC), which is called positive correlation, we rewrite it as
n˙(t)  v(n(t)) =
KX
i=1
n˙i(t)
0BBBBBB@vi(n(t))   1K
KX
j=1
v j(n(t))
1CCCCCCA : (22)
In general, it would be reasonable to expect that each term in the summation
over i is positive: if the payo from city i is higher than the average payo (i.e.,
vi(n(t))   1K
PK
j=1 v j(n(t)) > 0), then the mass of consumers choosing city i should
increase (i.e., n˙i(t) > 0), and vice versa. Condition (PC) only requires that this
be true in the aggregate. Therefore, in learning periods, it is possible that the
16Considering a general dynamical system allows us to include set-valued dynamics such as the
best-response dynamics which is important from the game-theoretic point of view.
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mass of consumers choosing city i increases even though it yields a less-than-
average payo. Condition (NS), which is called Nash stationary, states that if there
is a profitable deviation, some consumers change their locations. Under condition
(PC), the converse is also true.17 Therefore, under conditions (PC) and (NS), n˙(t) = 0
if and only if n(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Specific examples of admissible dynamics include the best response dynamic
(Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic (Brown,
1950), and the projection dynamic (Dupuis, 1993).18 One important remark is that
the replicator dynamic (Taylor, 1978), which is often used in spatial economic models
(e.g., Fujita et al., 1999), is not admissible. Under the replicator dynamic, a rest point
is always attained on the boundary, but the boundary points are not always Nash
equilibria. Thus, condition (NS) does not hold under the replicator dynamic.19
2.3.2 Stability Condition of Equilibrium
The admissible dynamics are closely connected to the potential function, and
thereby to the stability of Nash equilibria. Given a dynamic, we say that a popula-
tion distribution n 2  is stable if there exists a neighborhood U   of n such that
n(t) ! n for any trajectory n(  ) of the dynamic with n(0) 2 U. In particular, if we
can consider  for U, n is globally stable. n 2  is unstable if it is not stable.
To understand how the admissible dynamics are related to the potential func-
tion, let us consider our game G = (vi)Ki=1 with the potential function W given by
(18). Note that, by conditions (PC) and (NS), any trajectory n(  ) of an admissi-
ble dynamic monotonically ascends the potential function until it reaches a Nash
17See Proposition 4.3 of Sandholm (2001).
18See Sandholm (2005) for more examples.
19The replicator dynamics belongs to the class of strict myopic adjustment dynamics due to Swinkels
(1993) where Nash stationary is not imposed.
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equilibrium because
W˙(n(t)) =
KX
i=1
@W(n(t))
@ni
n˙i(t) =
KX
i=1
vi(n(t))n˙i(t) > 0 (23)
whenever n˙(t) , 0.20 Therefore, if Nash equilibrium n does not locally maximize
W, we can perturb n so that the trajectory ascends W and goes away from the
equilibrium. In other words, assuming that each Nash equilibrium is isolated, a
Nash equilibrium is stable under any admissible dynamics if and only if it locally maximizes
an associated potential function.21 Therefore, if a game has a potential function, we
can characterize the stability of equilibria under admissible dynamics by looking
at the shape of the potential function.
2.3.3 Instability of Population Distributions
In view of the observation above, we investigate the relationship between in-
teraction cost  and the instability of spatial equilibria. We elaborate this point by
obtaining a sucient condition under which a population distribution could not
be stable even if it were a spatial equilibrium.
Let n 2  be a spatial equilibrium such that supp n = L  S where supp n is
the support of n (i.e., supp n = fi 2 S : ni > 0g). We denote the cardinality of L
by jLj. Because a stable spatial equilibrium locally maximizes potential function
W, we may investigate its Hessian H, while we have to consider the fact that
trajectories of admissible dynamics stay in . To this end, let GL be the matrix of
the active constraints’ gradients corresponding to L. For example, if L = S n f1g,
GL =
  1 1  1 1 0  0 0, where the prime means the transpose of matrix, because the active
20Recall that n˙(t) = 0 if and only if n(t) is a Nash equilibrium.
21See Sandholm (2001) for a formal argument about this.
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constraints are
PK
i=1 ni = 1 and  n1  0. Let ZL be a GL’s null-space matrix. Then,
the second-order necessary condition implies that n does not locally maximize W
if HL  Z0LHZL is not negative semi-definite, and this boils down to showing that
the largest eigenvalue of HL is positive.22
Choosing reference city k 2 L, let DL be the submatrix of D representing travel
costs within L n fkg and dkL = (dki)i2Lnfkg. Then, we can take ZL so that
HL = H1 +H2 (24)
where
H1 = dkL 
 1 + (dkL 
 1)0  DL; (25)
H2 = diag[(h0i(ni))i2Lnfkg] + h
0
k(nk)1
01: (26)
In the formula above, 
 denotes the Kronecker product, 1 is a vector of oneswith an
appropriate dimension, and diag(x) is the diagonal matrix having x as its diagonal
elements. For analytical convenience, we choose the left end city in support of n as
a reference city. Note that every matrix and vector is defined for support L which
is generally a subset of S. However, to simplify notations, we sometimes suppress
subscript Lwhen no confusion arises.23
In the following analysis, we exploit the fact that a support of spatial equilibrium
can be considered a downsized replica of the full support. Specifically, populated
cities in a spatial equilibrium are congregated (i.e., there is no vacant city between
any populated cities) as shown in the following lemma:
22HL is called the reducedHessian. See, for example, Griva et al. (2009).
23For example, H1 and H2 should have been written as H1L and H2L.
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Lemma 3. Suppose n 2  is a spatial equilibrium. Then, suppn 2 SC where
SC =
n
fi1; :::; iag  S : i j+1 = i j + 1; 1  j  a   1; a 2 S
o
: (27)
Proof. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
As a result, the properties of D carry over to DL. As we will see in further sections,
this significantly simplifies the analysis and enables us to obtain analytical insights.
To attain a threshold value of  above which the largest eigenvalue of HL is
positive, we invoke Weyl’s inequality that says
max(HL)  jLj 1(HL)  jLj  j(H1) +  j(H2) (28)
for 2  j  jLj 1wherei(M) is the i-th smallest eigenvalue ofmatrixM.24 Although
wemade some adjustments to account for feasibility constraints, we can see thatH1
corresponds to agglomeration forceW1 whereasH2 corresponds to dispersion force
W2. Indeed, because DL is conditionally negative definite as D is by Lemma 3, it
follows that H1 is positive definite, and thus all of its eigenvalues are also positive.
Therefore, H1 acts as the destabilizing force against interior distribution. On the
other hand, because hi is a decreasing function, all of H2’s eigenvalues, except for
one zero eigenvalue, are negative, and thus H2 acts as the stabilizing force. The
threshold value is attained when those two forces are balanced:
Proposition 1. A population distribution n 2  such that suppn = L cannot be a stable
spatial equilibrium if  > min2 jjLj 1  j 1(diag[(jh0i(ni)j)i2Lnfkg])=jLj  j(H1).
To closely examine the instability condition above, we consider the linear cost
24Weyl’s inequality states that p(B+C)  p+q(B)+n q(C) for q 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; n pg and p(B+C) 
p q+1(B) + q(C) for q 2 f1; 2; :::; pg where B and C are n  n symmetric matrices. See Theorem 4.3.1
and Corollary 4.3.3 of Horn and Johnson (2013).
18
(di j = jxi   x jj) and the exponential cost (di j = ejxi x jj   1). Moreover, to abstract away
from the spatial variation of h0i(ni), we assume h
0
i (ni) =  K=A for any i 2 S.25 Then,
we can see that HL is independent of the population distribution, and HL = HL0
whenever L;L0 2 SC and jLj = jL0j. Thus, wemay focus on the number of populated
cities in a spatial equilibrium. The following corollaries give the explicit expressions
of threshold values of  for each case:
Corollary 1.1. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A and di j = jxi x jj. Then, a population distribution
n 2  having R populated cities cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium if
 > l(R) 

1   cos 2
2R + 1

K2
A
: (29)
Corollary 1.2. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A and di j = ejxi x jj   1. Then, a population distri-
bution n 2  having R populated cities cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium if
 > e(R)  1
e2=K   1

1 + e2=K   2e1=K cos 2
R   1

K
A
: (30)
There are two remarks here. First, because e(R) and l(R) are decreasing in
R, the maximum possible number of populated cities that might constitute a stable spatial
equilibrium is decreasing in  in either of exponential and linear cases. Second,
it follows that e(K) and l(K) are increasing in K whereas e(K) ! 2A(1 + 42)
and l(K) ! 2=(2A) as K ! 1. Therefore, if  is suciently large, a population
distribution with full support cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium for any finite K.
25This can be induced through Mossay and Picard’s (2011) model. See Section 3.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
Wehave seen how the potential function approach generally works for discrete-
space social interaction models, and, as an illustration, we obtained an instability
condition with respect to . In deriving a sucient condition for the statement
that a population distribution cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium, we do not
have to guarantee that a population distribution is indeed a spatial equilibrium.
However, if we are interested in equilibrium properties such as the multiplicity
and stability of equilibria, we have to demonstrate that population distributions
under consideration are actually spatial equilibria. Therefore, there would be no
hope for attaining analytical observations under a general environment.
Thus, in what follows, to get clear insights into the equilibrium properties of the
discrete-space model, we adopt Mossay and Picard’s (2011) specification in which
fi(x) =   2x and di j = jxi   x jj, and exploit its linear structure. Indeed, under these
assumptions, we have
hi(ni) = fi
 A
niK

  A
niK
f 0i
 A
niK

=  niK=A (31)
for all i 2 S, and therefore the net utility from land at equilibrium is linear in n.
In this section,we compare the equilibriumproperties of ourmodelwith thoseof
Mossay and Picard’s continuous-space model. As mentioned in the introduction,
a symmetric unimodal population distribution is attained as the unique spatial
equilibrium in their model. Invoking the argument above, we would like to see
whether this result is robust in terms of the discretization of space.
Let us formallydefine theproperties of a populationdistribution (i.e., unimodal-
ity and symmetry) that characterize theunique equilibriumof the continuous-space
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model. We can say that a population distribution is unimodal if there is k 2 S such
that nk > ni for all i , k. This means that the single largest city exists in the region.
Moreover, a population distribution is symmetric if
8>>>>><>>>>>:
n K
2  i = nK2 +i for all 1  i  K2 if K + 1 is odd;
n K 1
2
= nK+1
2
and nK 1
2  i = n K+12 +i for all 1  i  K 32 if K + 1 is even:
Because the total number of cities is exogenously given, we are interested in the
essential multiplicity of equilibria in terms of population distributions restricted
to the support of spatial equilibria. As we observed, all spatial equilibria exhibit
the same population distribution over their supports, as long as the number of
populated cities is fixed. Therefore, we aim to find cases in which spatial equilibria
with dierent numbers of populated cities simultaneously exist.
In Section 3.1, we are concerned with the essential multiplicity of spatial equi-
libria. We show that, if  is large, the spatial equilibrium is essentially non-unique.
It is worth pointing out that this result is true for any K. In Section 3.2, we show
that a stable equilibrium having the properties of the continuous-space model’s
unique equilibrium does not always exist. In particular, we find a case in which
the single largest city does not exist at any stable equilibrium.
3.1 Multiplicity of Spatial Equilibria
Now that we are interested in the existence of multiple equilibria, we need to
examine equilibrium conditions. Note that, because v(n)  (vi(n))Ki=1 is linear in n,
the distribution over the support of a spatial equilibrium solves a system of linear
equations. To simplify notations, we focus on population distribution having full
support without loss of generality. Then, observing that (2) can be expressed in
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matrix form Dn, payo vector v(n) is written as
v(n) = Y1   Dn   K
A
En = Y1   Cn (32)
where E is the identity matrix with an appropriate dimension and
C = D +
K
A
E: (33)
Because n is a spatial equilibrium, there exists v 2 R such that vi(n) = v for all
i 2 S. Furthermore, the equilibrium value of w  Y   v is given by (10C 11) 1 2 R
because
w 1 = Cn) w 10C 11 = 10n = 1
where the prime means the transpose of vector or matrix. Therefore, n solves
Cn =

10C 11
 1
1: (34)
Note that the analogue argument holds for support L  S ifmatrices and vectors are
restricted to L. This implies that a spatial equilibriumwith support L is generically
unique if it exists.26 Thus, the number of equilibria is atmost one for each L  S, and
therefore, the set of spatial equilibria is finite. Furthermore, recall that populated
cities in a spatial equilibrium are congregated (Lemma 3). Therefore, we can see
that the number of spatial equilibria having R populated cities is K   R + 1 where
1  R  K. Then, by invoking index theory, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 4. If there is a spatial equilibrium n such that jsuppnj < K, then there is another
spatial equilibrium n0 such that jsuppn0j , jsuppnj.
26For spatial equilibria, we have to address unpopulated cities in addition to (34).
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Thus, if a spatial equilibriumhaving someunpopulated cities exists, then there is
necessarily another spatial equilibrium that is essentially dierent from the equilib-
rium. Therefore, the only situation inwhich the (essential)multiplicity of equilibria
will not arise is when the spatial equilibrium with full support uniquely exists.
We illustrate the multiplicity of spatial equilibria by finding cases when a spa-
tial equilibrium with full support cannot be stable even if it exists. Since every
admissible evolutionary dynamics converges to a spatial equilibrium, if the spatial
equilibrium with full support exists but is unstable, an admissible dynamic start-
ing in the unstable manifold converges to another equilibrium that must have a
dierent number of populated cities.
In view of Corollary 1.1, we already know that a population distribution with
full support cannot represent a stable spatial equilibrium if  > l(K) where l(K) is
given by (29). Therefore, we conclude the following result:
Proposition 2. The spatial equilibrium is essentially non-unique if  > l(K).
As we observed, l(K) is increasing in K but converges to 
2
2A as K ! 1. Thus, if
 > 
2
2A , the spatial equilibrium is essentially non-unique for any finite K.
3.2 Stability of Symmetric Unimodal Distributions
Recall that, in Mossay and Picard’s continuous-space model, the unique equi-
librium displays a symmetric distribution in which the peak is attained at a single
central location. In our discrete-space model, the model’s structure implies that
any spatial equilibrium has a symmetric distribution over its support. Moreover,
its peak is attained at a single city if the number of populated cities is odd, but
not if it is even. In particular, the following lemma provides a sucient condition
for the existence of stable spatial equilibria with two populated cities, at which the
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population is evenly distributed over the cities:
Lemma 5. If K2=(2A) <  < K2=A, a population distribution n 2  such that suppn =
fi; jg 2 SC and ni j =

1
2 ;
1
2

is a stable spatial equilibrium.27
Note that, by (34), there is no other equilibrium such that ni j ,

1
2 ;
1
2

.
Observe that the single largest city does not exist at
ei+e j
2 which is characterized
in the lemma above. Thus, we are interested in whether there exists another stable
spatial equilibrium in which a single city attains the highest population when
K2=(2A) <  < K2=A. Note that HR+1, the Hessian of W restricted to population
distributions having R + 1 populated cities, can be written as
0BBBBBBBB@ HR yy0 a
1CCCCCCCCA (35)
where y is the last column of HR and a = 2K R   2KA . Then, by Cauchy’s interlacing
theorem, max(HR+1)  max(HR).28 Thus, if a spatial equilibrium having R populated
cities is unstable, then there is no stable equilibrium havingmore than R populated cities. In
particular, because max(H3) = 2A K
2
AK , there is no stable equilibrium having more
than two populated cities if  > K2=(2A).
Thus, if  > K2=(2A), the only situation inwhich a single city attains the highest
population is represented by a full agglomeration in one city. However, by Lemma
A1, such a population distribution is not a spatial equilibrium when  < K2=A.
Therefore, it turns out that
ei+e j
2 where fi; jg 2 SC is the only stable equilibriumwhen
K2=(2A) <  < K2=A, and we conclude the following result:
Proposition 3. The single largest city does not emerge at any stable spatial equilibria if
K2=(2A) <  < K2=A.
27For notational convenience, we write ni j for nfi; jg.
28See, for example, Theorem 4.3.17 of Horn and Johnson (2013).
24
4 The Limit of Discrete-Space Models
We investigated the equilibrium properties of discrete-space model in the pre-
vious section, but we have not studied any potential connections between discrete-
space and continuous-space models. In particular, a natural question to ask is
whether there is a sequence of the discrete-space model’s spatial equilibria that
converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous-space model as the number
of cities goes to infinity while the size of a region is fixed (or the distance between
adjacent cities vanishes). In this section, we provide a positive answer to this ques-
tion. In fact, we show that any sequence of spatial equilibria in a discrete space
converges to a single equilibrium in a continuous space.
In Mossay and Picard’s (2011) model, the unique equilibrium has ( b; b)  R
as its support where b = 2
p

2 . To make our analysis compatible with theirs, we
assume that the region is given by [ c; c] where b < c and the location of city i is
xKi =
2c
K

i   12

  c for i 2 S. Moreover, because they assume that the land density is
uniformly one, we let A = 2c.
We start with a continuous-space model and denote the population at location
x by (x). Mossay and Picard (2011) characterize the equilibrium conditions as
(x) +

2
”(x) = 0; (36)
( b) = 0; (b) = 0;
Z b
 b
(x)dx = 1: (37)
Note that, because the general solution of (36) is an even function, ( b) = 0 ,
(b) = 0. Hence, it suces to impose ( b) = 0. Moreover, integrating both sides
of (36) over [ b; b] and invoking the population constraint R b b (x)dx = 1, we have
0( b) 0(b) = 2=. Then, because0(x) is an odd function,0( b) =  0(b) = =.
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Therefore, the conditions reduce to:
(x) +

2
”(x) = 0; (38)
0( b) = 

; (39)
( b) = 0: (40)
Wewould like to show that the equilibrium conditions of a discrete-spacemodel
converge to the above ones as K !1. To this end, let us take a sequence of spatial
equilibria, and let nK be the population distribution restricted to the support of
spatial equilibrium for K. By Lemma 3, we may assume that the support for K is
LK =
n
¯`K; ¯`K + 1; ¯`K + 2; :::; ¯`K + RK   1
o
where ¯`K; ¯`K + RK   1 2 S. Let " = 2c=K. In what follows, we approximate (xKi )
by Ki  nKi =" that is interpreted as the population density in city i. The following
lemma summarizes equilibrium conditions that nK has to satisfy:
Lemma 6. Suppose that nK is a population distribution over LK  f1; 2; :::;Kg that is the
support of a spatial equilibrium. Then, it solves
Kj +

2"2
(Kj 1   2Kj + Kj+1) = 0 for j 2
n
¯`K + 1; ¯`K + 2; :::; ¯`K + RK   2
o
; (41)
"K¯`K +

2"
(K¯`K+1   K¯`K) =
1
2
; (42)
K¯`K + 
K
¯`K+R 1 
2"

: (43)
Note that, because xKj+1   xKj = ", (41) becomes (38), whereas (42) becomes
0(x ¯`) =


(44)
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where x ¯` = limK!1 xK¯`K as K goes to infinity, or " goes to zero. Moreover, because
each of K¯`K and 
K
¯`K+R 1 are nonnegative, (43) becomes
(x ¯`) = 0 (45)
as K ! 1. Therefore, limiting population distribution solves dierential equation
(38) with boundary conditions (44) and (45). Thus, the equilibrium conditions of
population distribution with support LK converge to the equilibrium conditions in
the continuous space only when x ¯` =  b.
However, it follows that this is always true as long as we take a sequence of
spatial equilibria. Indeed, if x ¯` ,  b, the solution to dierential scheme (38), (44),
and (45) does not satisfy the population constraint (i.e.,
R
(x)dx , 1). This means
that the population constraint does not hold either when K is suciently large,
but this contradicts the fact that we are taking a sequence of spatial equilibria. In
other words, we cannot take a sequence of spatial equilibria such that the support
does not converge to ( b; b). Therefore, equilibrium conditions (41)-(43) converge
to equilibrium conditions (38)-(40) as K !1.
In general, the convergence of a discrete scheme to a dierential scheme does
not necessarily imply that the solution also converges.29 However, by solving
scheme (41)-(43), we can verify that the solution of scheme (41)-(43) converges to
that of scheme (38)-(40) as K !1. We thus obtain the following result:
Proposition 4. max1iK
(xKi )   Ki  ! 0 as K !1.
Observe that, in the argument above, the sequence of spatial equilibria is arbi-
trary. Thus, any sequence of spatial equilibria converges to the unique equilibrium
29The mathematics literature including the finite dierence method addresses the relationship be-
tween dierence and dierential equations. See, for example, LeVeque (2007).
27
of the continuous-space model. Recall that spatial equilibrium in a discrete space
is generally not unique. In particular, when  is large, a spatial equilibrium is
essentially non-unique whenever K is finite (Proposition 2). Nevertheless, each
equilibrium converges to the single equilibrium as K ! 1. This means that the
set of spatial equilibria parametrized by K is upper hemi-continuous at the limit.
Furthermore, because the spatial equilibrium in the continuous space is unique,
the lower hemi-continuity is implied by the upper hemi-continuity. Therefore, the
set of spatial equilibria is continuous in K at the limit.
5 Conclusion
We studied the properties of discrete-space social interaction models by us-
ing the potential game approach. Although the continuous-space model has a
symmetric unimodal distribution as a unique equilibrium, we showed that such
a distribution is not always stable, and that the uniqueness is not robust in the
discrete-space model. However, we also showed that any sequence of the discrete-
space model’s equilibria converges to the equilibrium of the continuous-space
model as the distance between adjacent cities vanishes.
In this paper, we considered social interactions among a single type of agents.
Thus, a natural extension is to consider multiple types of agents. There is a rich
literature on (continuous-space) social interaction models having both consumers
and firms.30 Because of general equilibrium eects, the properties of equilibrium is
more complex than the class of models considered here. In particular, equilibrium
is generally not unique even in the continuous-space model, although the stability
of equilibria has not been explored. It is dicult to determine the stability of
30See Chapter 6 of Fujita and Thisse (2013) and references therein.
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equilibria in the continuous-space model, but we may be able to address this by
approximating the model with a discrete-space model.
Finally, although we did not engage in policy discussions, the spatial equi-
librium of our model is generally not ecient because social interactions cause
externalities. Indeed, population distribution is more concentrated at social opti-
mum than at market equilibrium. This is a consequence of positive externalities
in social interactions, which yields under-agglomeration. Thus, to achieve a social
optimum, it is necessary that the planner internalize those externalities. However,
because the equilibrium under such an intervention is not necessarily unique as
in a laissez-faire case, there may exist a stable equilibrium besides social optima.
Therefore, in contrast to the continuous world, the policy design to achieve a social
optimum in the discrete world is not straightforward because of the multiplicity of
equilibria. This is an important subject of future research.31
Appendix
Lemma A1. ei 2  is a spatial equilibrium if and only if   K2=A.
Proof. vi(ei)   v j(ei) = h(1)   h(0) + d ji. Therefore,
vi(ei)  v j(ei) for any j , i, h(0)   h(1)  min
j,i
d ji = =K: 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium n in
which, for some i; j 2 suppnwith j i  2, n` = 0 for all i < ` < j. Let k 2 fi+1; ::; j 1g.
31Sandholm (2007) and Fujishima (2013) consider Pigouvian tax policies in the presence of mul-
tiple equilibria.
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Then, because di` + dik  dk` and dk` + d jk  d j` for `  i,
iX
`=1
di`n` + dik
iX
`=1
n` 
iX
`=1
dk`n` 
iX
`=1
d j`n`   d jk
iX
`=1
n`: (46)
Similarly,
KX
`= j
d j`n` + d jk
KX
`= j
n` 
KX
`= j
dk`n` 
KX
`= j
di`n`   dik
KX
`= j
n`: (47)
Without loss of generality, suppose
PK
`= j n` 
Pi
`=1 n`. Then,
KX
`=1
d j`n` 
KX
`=1
d j`n` +
KX
`= j
(di`   d j`   dik   d jk)n` (48)

KX
`=1
d j`n` +
KX
`= j
(di`   d j`   dik)n`   d jk
iX
`=1
n` 
KX
`=1
dk`n`: (49)
Therefore,
hi(ni)   h j(n j)  
KX
`=1
(di`   d j`)n` > hi(ni)   h j(0)  
KX
`=1
(di`   d j`)n`
 hi(ni)   hk(0)  
KX
`=1
(di`   dk`)n`  0 * vi(n)  vk(n):
But this contradicts i; j 2 suppn (i.e., vi(n) = v j(n)). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Because D is conditionally negative definite, it follows from
Lemma 3 that DL is also conditionally negative definite, and this further implies
that H1 is positive definite. Thus, all of H1’s eigenvalues are positive. On the other
hand, the eigenvalues of h0k(nk)1
01 are (jLj   1)h0k(nk) and 0, so the matrix has exactly
one negative eigenvalue because h0i(n) < 0 for any i 2 S. Thus, byWeyl’s inequality,
i(H2)  i 1(diag[(h0i (ni))i2Lnfkg]).
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Then, by invoking Weyl’s inequality for H1 +H2, we obtain
max(HL)  jLj 1(HL)  jLj  j(H1) +  j(H2) (50)
 jLj  j(H1) +  j 1(diag[(h0i (ni))i2Lnfkg]) (51)
where 2  j  jLj   1. Because ni > 0 for all i 2 L,  j 1(diag[(h0i(ni))i2Lnfkg]) 2 ( 1; 0)
for 2  j  jLj   1. Therefore, we obtain the stated result. 
Proof of Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A. Because the Hessian does
not depend on population distribution, we may focus on the number of populated
cities by letting HL = HR for any L 2 SC such that jLj = R.
Suppose di j = jxi   x jj. In this case, we can directly compute the inverse of H1 as
H 11 =
K
2
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
2  1
 1 2  1
 1 2  1
: : : : : : : : :
 1 2  1
 1 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (52)
This is an (R  1) (R  1)-dimensional tridiagonal Toeplitz matrix where the lower
right corner is perturbed. Yueh and Cheng (2008) attain explicit expressions for
the eigenvalues of this class of matrices. Invoking their results, it follows that
p(H 11 ) = K

1   cos 2p2R+1

. Thus, p(H1) = 1K

1   cos 2(R p)2R+1
 1
. Then, because
max(HR)  R 1(H1)   K=A, we obtain l(R).
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Next, suppose di j = ejxi x jj   1, and let  = exp(1=K). Then, DR =  R   101where
 R =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1  2    R 2
 1     R 3
2  1    R 4
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
R 2 R 3 R 4    1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (53)
Unfortunately, the eigenvalues of H1 are no longer easily attainable, as opposed
to the linear case. Thus, instead, we obtain the eigenvalues of  R, and attain a
condition stronger than the one in Proposition 1.
The inverse of  R is
  1R =
1
1   2
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1  
  1 + 2  
: : : : : : : : :
  1 + 2  
  1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (54)
This is a tridiagonal Toeplitzmatrixwhere the upper left and lower right corners are
perturbed. On the basis of the results of Yueh andCheng (2008), we havep(   1R ) =
1
2 1

1 + 2   2 cos (p 1)R 1

, and thus p(  R) = (2   1)

1 + 2   2 cos (R p 1)R 1
 1
.
On the other hand, the eigenvalues of 10R 11R 1 are R   1 and 0. Thus, the matrix
does not have a negative eigenvalue, and hence i( DR)  i(  R).
The eigenvalues of dkL
1+(dkL
1)0 areP j2Lnfkg dkj pR   1qP j2Lnfkg d2kj and 0. By
Ho¨lder’s inequality,
P
j2Lnfkg dkj 
p
R   1
qP
j2Lnfkg d2kj, thus the matrix has at most
one negative eigenvalue. Hence, i(H1)  i 1( DR). Then, because max(HR) 
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R 2(H1) + 1(diag[(h0i(ni))i2Lnfkg])  R 3(  R)   K=A, we obtain e(R). 
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose, to the contrary, that every spatial equilibrium has R
populated cities where R < K. To show the result, we use index theory. Define the
index of a spatial equilibrium having L as its support by
indL =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 1 if detHL > 0;
0 if detHL = 0;
1 if detHL < 0;
(55)
where detHL is the determinant ofHL. Then, indices of each spatial equilibria must
sum up to one by the index theorem of Simsek et al. (2007).32 However, because
HL = HL0 whenever L; L0 2 SC and jLj = jL0j, it follows from Lemma 3 that the total
value of indices of spatial equilibria having R populated cities is either K   R + 1,
 (K   R + 1), or 0. In either case, it is not one. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose K2=(2A) <  < K2=A, and let n 2  be a population
distribution such that supp n = fi; jg 2 SC and ni j =

1
2 ;
1
2

. LetW() = W(ei + (1  
)e j) where  2 [0; 1] and ei is the unit vector having one for the i-th element. Note
that n = ei+e j2 . Then, because di j = d ji = 1=K,W
0() = riW()   r jW() = 0 at  = 12 .
Moreover,
W00() =
@2W()
@n2i
+
@2W()
@n2j
  2@
2W()
@ni@n j
= h0() + h0(1   ) + 2di j:
Then, because h0(n) =  K=A, W00( 12 ) < 0 if  < K2=A, and thus W() is locally
maximized at  = 12 on the line segment connecting ei and e j. On the other hand,
32Simsek et al. (2007) establish the index theorem that is applicable to the KKT set of nonlinear
programming (See, in particular, Proposition 5.2). Their theorem is relevant to us because the set of
spatial equilibria coincides with that of KKT points of the potential’s maximization problem.
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because mink2Snfi; jg
dki+dkj
2 =
3
2K and  > K
2=(2A),
riW( 12 )   r`W( 12 ) = h(12 )   
 
di j
2
  d`i + d` j
2
!
 h(12 )   
 
di j
2
  min
k2Snfi; jg
dki + dkj
2
!
=  K
2A
  
2K
+
3
2K
> 0
for any ` 2 S n fi; jg. Therefore, it follows that W is locally maximized at n, and we
obtain the desired result. 
Proof of Lemma 6. To simplify notations, we omit superscript k of LK; ¯`K, and RK.
Recall from Section 3.1 that nK must solve a system of linear equations. Specifically,
multiplying both sides of CLnK = wK 1 by 1D
 1
L from the left, n
K solves

E +

"
D 1L

nK = wKD 1L 1 (56)
where wK = (10C 1L 1)
 1. Note that, because jLj = R,
D 1L =
1
2"
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
R 1   1 1 1R 1
1  2 1
1  2 1
: : : : : : : : :
1  2 1
1
R 1 1
1
R 1   1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (57)
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Then, we have
"Kj +

2"

K( j)   Kj +
1
R   1(
K
¯` + 
K
¯`+R 1)

=
1
"
1
R   1w
K for j 2 f ¯`; ¯`+ R   1g;
(58)
Kj +

2"2
(Kj 1   2Kj + Kj+1) = 0 for j 2 f ¯`+ 1; ¯`+ 2; :::; ¯`+ R   2g; (59)
where ( ¯`) = ¯`+ 1 and ( ¯`+ R   1) = ¯`+ R   2. Summing the first and last rows of
CLnK = wK 1 in each of left-hand and right-hand sides, we have
wK =
"
2
(R   1) + 
2
(K¯` + 
K
¯`+R 1): (60)
Substituting this into (58), we obtain
"K¯` +

2"
(K¯`+1   K¯` ) =
1
2
: (61)
The analogue relationship holds for j = ¯`+ R   1. Moreover, because ¯`  1; ¯`+ R <
suppnK,
PR
j=1 jnK¯` 1+ j  wK and
PR
j=1( ¯`+ 1   j)nK¯` 1+ j  wK. Hence, by (60),
2wK   "(R + 1) = (K¯` + K¯`+R 1)   2"  0: (62)
Therefore, the equilibrium conditions are summarized as (41)-(43). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Multiplying the LHS of (41) by 2"2=, we get
Ki+1   2aKKi + Ki 1 = 0: (63)
where aK = 1 "2=. It follows that the solution property crucially depends on the
sign of DK = (aK)2   1. Because we are interested in the case where K is suciently
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large, we assume DK < 0. Then, the solution is represented as
Ki = C
K
1 cos(!
Ki) + CK2 sin(!
Ki) (64)
= CK cos(!Ki   K) (65)
where CK =
q
(CK1 )
2 + (CK2 )
2, !K = cos 1(aK) with 0  !K < 2, and K satisfies
CK cos K = CK1 and C
K sin K = CK2 . Because 
K
i , which is given by cosine function
(65), is nonnegative for all i 2 L, we assume [!K ¯`  K; !K( ¯`+ R   1)   K]  [ 2 ; 2 ]
without loss of generality.
By symmetry, K¯` = 
K
¯`+R 1. Thus, 
K = !
K(2 ¯`+R 1)
2 . Then, because " =
xK¯`+R 1 xK¯`
R 1 ,
1
CK

2"
(K¯`+1   K¯` ) =

2"

cos(!K( ¯`+ 1)   K)   cos(!K ¯`  K)

(66)
=
!K(R   1)
2(xK¯`+R 1   xK¯` )
sin

!K(R 2)
2

sin

!K
2

!K=2
: (67)
Note that limK!1 K¯`+R 1 = 0 ) limK!1!K(R   1) = . Moreover, limK!1!K = 0
because aK ! 1 as K !1. Therefore, by (42), CK ! (x ¯`+R 1 x ¯`) as K !1.
Now, fix location x. Then,
CK cos

!K
1 + K
2
+
x
"

  K

= CK cos
266664!K"
0BBBB@x   xK¯`+R 1 + xK¯`2
1CCCCA377775 (68)
! (x ¯`+R 1   x ¯`)

cos
 

2
2x   x ¯`+R 1   x ¯`
x ¯`+R 1   x ¯`
!
(69)
as K ! 1. Then, because x ¯`+R 1 = b and x ¯` =  b, we obtain 4b cos


2bx

. This is the
solution to scheme (38)-(40), and we thus complete the proof. 
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